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1. INTRODUCTION 
I'<n IJetter or for worse, geoengineering has 1l1Oveci fWIlI the fringes of the climate 
change debate to the halls of Capitol Hill' ,llld Westlllillster.' Of course, a great 
deal of research remaillS to be dOlle before the world decides whether to intro-
duce gcocngillcering as a coltlplement to Initigation and adaptatioll; ac,l(lcillics 
and policy makers are still wrestling with Ihe scielltific, political, legal, social, and 
ethical qllcstiollS SllffOllilding the illtentiollallilodification of the climate. llere we 
address the illStitlitiollal aspects of SOllle of tilt' cthical isslies rai:>ed by research on 
geoellgllleefillg. 
The lIlost ethicall\' cllallengillg form of geoellgilleerillg research ill\"()ives solar 
radiation managclllent (SRM),' wllich atteillpts to redllce the emth's absorptioll of 
incoming solar radiatiun. One proposed lIlechanislll for SIUvl is the illjectioll of 
aerosols into the stratosphere, which wOlild deflect more solar radiation back into 
space. III contrast to research into carbon dioxide removal (CDR), which is the 
olhe) Iliaill category of proposed geoengineerillg activities, SRl\l research is par-
1"'1 ti:nh challellging ethically because studying and testing S IUvl tecllllologies can 
relJuire deployment at scales that could have significant regional or global climatic 
effects.' 1;(H instance, testing the effects of stratospheric aerosol illjection would 
require lofting enough aerosols into the atmosphere, over a long ellough period of 
See Ccocilgillcerilll.; 1[1: I)ollll"stic alld IlltcfllatiollalRcscarcli Cm'ClllallCC. 111111 COII~. (2010/. 
See Scicllcc &: 'I "e1llloiog\ COlllllliltce, Tile RCgll"llioll OfCCOCllgilll"cring. 2010. I I.C 221 at ,. 
SOlllC earlier work, illellldillg Olm, rck" to SIUd ," '",IIorl-w;]\'c clilliaic cllgillccring." \\'c regard 
IIIc,c 1110 lenm "s ')"0"\""101". See I)a, id It rViorro\\, Robert I·:. Kol'P &: f\iicl"lcl 0l'l'cllllcilller, 
'/(lll'urd Elilicdl Norms alld lnstillitiolls 1(" Climate Engineering Research. 4 ENVTI.. RES. I.E'ITERS 
045106. 2 (2009). See d/su J.J. BLACKSTOCK E'I AI.., CJ.J~fATE ENGINEEI(Jr-.C; RESI'Or-;SI<S TO CJ.JMATE 
E~IERCENCIES 2 (2009). 
4 BI.ACKSTOCK et "I., sllprd 1I0le "at 25. 
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Illlle, to distinguish tlte effect of Illl' ;1(,1()~01) IrOl1l lIonn,d climatic variatioll.' The 
conseqtlences of stich large-selic lestlllg COIild calise serious harm to milliom of 
people. For Instance, SRM cOllld change regional precipitation patterns, threaten-
ing water supplies and agriculture." Moreover, whereas CDR aims to return the 
atmosphcre to an carlier, familiar state, SRM aims to create a new state - one of 
high greenhollse gas (CHC) concentrations and redllced IllSolation - about which 
we know IllllCh less. 
In an earlier paper we sllggested three ethical principles for SRM research based 
on established principles for biomedical research with human subjects. 7 The anal-
ogy between SRM and biomedical research is, like all analogies, imperfect. [n this 
chapter, we consider sOllle of the ethical implications of olle limitation of that anal-
ogy - nallicly, the fact tlwt decisions to participatc in biolllcdical experiments arc 
made individually, whereas the decision to "participate" ill an SRM experiment is a 
collective decisioll. Specifically, we explore the possibility of designing an intem3-
tional institution that would have the llJoral authority to make collective decisions 
about SRM experiments. We c01lSider the requisite features of such an institution 
and examine the charactcristics of other global governance institutions as COllJpa-
rable cases. 
2. THE BIOMEDICAL MODEL FOR SRM RESEARCH ETHICS 
[n om earlier papcr, we proposed a basic framework for SRM research ethics that 
derives from principles governing biomedical research with human and anirnal 
sllbjeels.~ 
We intend our framework to ;lpply to large-,calc SRM experiments. Very roughly, 
"large-scale SRM experiments" are experiments that are large enough to signifi-
cantly alter the clilllate regionally or globally by changing the rate at which the earth 
absorbs incoming solar radiation, but smaller than would be deployed to counteract 
the radiative forcillg of allthropogenic CHCs on a global basis. For instance, inject-
ing enough aerosols into the stratosphere to distinguish their effeel from normal 
climatic variation'! constitutes a large-scale SRM experiment; releasing a few tOilS of 
1I,Ioffow et aI., s({pra note j, at h. 
" Alall Robock ct al.. A Test IlIr Ceoengineerillg" 327 SCI. 5je). 5,1 (lUlU) See al"" emllld"",,"\" g,da, 
K. Caldeira & R. Nelilani, Fasl versus Slow Resp,,"se ill C/lllla/e C;hallge: J/llpliealiolls lor Ihe 
Clobal Hydrological eve/e. ,5 CI.IMATE DYNAMICS .p,. ·n' (2. ". >I: .\. JOlin d ,rI. (;('()clIgi/l(wing hI' 
Stratospheric SO, Injection: Resulls from the Met ()lIlc!' I J"d( :I':,",J (.'illll"/'· ·\I"del ,I//(I CO/llparisoll 
with the Coddard Illstillite fllT Space Studies AlodelK " ,II \lOS '"I·" 1'11\\ ")'N. (HH.S (2'"0) 
JOlles et ;}t.. slipra Ilote 6; Id. at I. 
, Morro\\" d a I., sllpra Ilote ,. at ,-6. 
'I Roughly km to hlllldrcds of kilotollS per year if tire IlIlnl.IIII '\ c,1) ., .. , I'''' 11,\"1 "I ,,,ll.lle "c-IO-
sols, based 011 calcillatiolls Ilsing previousl\" published si'~IIrI" .111" 11",.1,,,1.1\ ,,,,,I 1.1<ll.lli,,· 1"'CllIg 
l\lorroH', Kopp, dlld Oppellhell/wl 
;termois frolll a single airplane to observe their physical ;lnd chcIllical reactiolls with 
other particles docs Hot, as sllch a sIIlall quantity of material could Hot significantly 
alter thc c1illlate. ThrolIghout this chapter, we lise "SRM experiment" to refer spe-
cifically to large-scale ac!i\·itics. We explicitly exclude climate modeling studies and 
small-scale field tests of SRM technologies, although we recognize that the line 
bem't'ell small-scale field tests and large-scale experiments is fuzzy. 
Om ethical fraIIlework for SRM experilllenb includes three basic principles: The 
Principle of Respect requires that researchers secure the global public's consent, 
in some appropriate fornI, before cOI1lIllellcing an cxperiment. 'o Tire Principle of 
BCllcficence and Justice requires that researchers protect the basic rights of persons 
affectcd by tlreir experiments, minimize the risk-benefit ratio of those experiments, 
;llld ;rill) to distribute those risks and bellefits jllstly across perSOIlS, allilllab, ami eco-
wstcIIIS." Thc Principle of Minimizatioll requires that experiments should not last 
IOllger, cover a greater geographic area, or exert a greatcr influcnce on the clilllate 
t Ilan is Ilecessary to test tire specific hypotheses in question." 
The analogy bem'cen SRM and biomedical research is, like all analogies, imper-
fect. T'he key limitation of this analogy is that individllab decide for themselves 
whether to participate in and face the risks of a bioIlledical experiment, whereas 
we must decide collecti\e1y whether to subject OllfselvcS to the risks of an SRM 
experiment. Irnagille two people who are eomidering participating in a trial of all 
experilllental antidepressant. The first person's decision about whether to partici-
pate has no effect 011 tire other's decision; it neither precludes nor requires that 
the other person participate. Thus, the fir~t person's decision docs not expose the 
second to allY risks. SRM is different. 'Il) "participate" in an SRM experiment, in the 
relevant sense, is to be subjected to the alteration of the climate. Tlms, no one call 
participate in the experilllent unless everyone participates in the experiment. In this 
respect, an SRM experiment is more like a public health intervention or collective 
social policy than it is a l1ledical experiment. For example, individuals cannot eas-
ily opt Ollt of mandatory vaccination policies, the fluoridation of drinking water, or 
national pension schemes. 
The necessity of "collective participation" in SRM experiments changes the way 
we think about risk and consent. In the bioIlledical case, we need to consider only 
the risks to the individllal participant (and, in some cases, Iris or her family). With 
SRM, we necd to consider both the scale and the distribution of risks. In the bio-
medical case, we can and shollid require the informed consent of each participant. If 
c,tilllatc,. For ,igllinc<lllce thrc,hold" see id. at 7: for radiative forcing c,tilllatc" see Alall Robock d 
ai, 'j'ropiwl (/Ild Arctic C(,Oellgilleerillg, IIj J. CEO. RES. 016101, at + (2008). 
l\\orfOW et ai, supra lIote ,\, cil +-5. 
" ld. at C;--(J. 
" ld. at 6. 
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1111l\'(:r:,allllfoflllCd cOIl:,ent is ellll("I111 I, 'I" II l'd ';)1 SRi\\ expertlllt'lIts, l!Jell ('1111(,11 
SIU\\cxperilllellts arc illlpm:,ihic III ~~(I"I,",I")IIC\er, wc rarely require IIILlllilll<1/1\ 
,I~n.'ciliellt in I llaling collcctive del'l\loll' I': \:II11p!cS of th is inc lude dClllOcr:illl gfJ\-
l'I'lllllCllts tklt sometillles iJllpmc 1111111:11\ :,i'II'ICe requirelllcnts, challge 1:1\ r:iln, 
IIlstitute redistrilJlltivc social safety nch, proll'd species or ccosvstcms, alld prolldlil 
II/ regulate the llse of certain technologics, cvell when sigllificant fracti()II~' of Illl' 
populatioll do Ilot a III I would not COllscnt to those policics. III disctlssing cOll\C'nl 
,lIld SRM cxpcrililents, we suggested that S()llle indirect forlll of consent .- SIWit ;IS 
,'onscllt voiccd through Ilational represcntatives ~ lIlay be ethically slIfficielil " III 
\\hat foliows, II'(.' consider the features that an institution would need ill order 10 
S(,I'Ve as a vehicle t()r such indirect cOllsent. 
3. COLLECTIVE DECISIONS, LEGITII\HCY, AND 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
\Ve cOlltelld that ill collecti\'t' decisiolls, the cClltralllofln,lti\'c cOllcem is tile legiti-
lIlacv of decisiolls ,llId decisioll llIakers rather thall ulliversal individual eOllsent. 
Thlls. the ethical COllduct of SRl\1 rcsemell reqllires all illStitUtiOll tllat 11:ls the 
,;Iobal politieallegitilltacy to make decisiolls about SRl\1 experimellts. 
Political philosophers recognize both a 1I0flllativc ami a descriptive (i.e., positivc) 
COllccpt of legitilllacy. Roughly, <Ill illStitUtiOIl is kgitilnate in the nOflll:ltivc sellse 
If it has the right to go\CfIl, alld it is legitilll<itc ill the descriptive sense if it is lIidel\, 
/ie/ie\'ed to h<ivC the right to govcm.'1 Bccamc the ethic;d cOllduct of SRM l'('sGlreh 
depellds Oil :1Il institution that has the right to gm'efll SRM research, rather Ihall 
olle that is IlIcrclv helieved to hal'c that right, we foclls 011 the nOflnative S(,llse of 
legi ti III <l ('V, 
Political philosophers aho distillgllish betweell the legitimacy of politic:d iml i-
IlltiOIlS and the kgitilllaC\' of decisions made by those institutions. To S<I\ 111:i1 ;1/1 
IIlstitUtiOIl is legitilllate is to say that with respect to some range of issucs, it 11:ls I Ill' 
III(nal authority to lIlake billding decisions for the people within its jurisdictioll." 'Iii 
,ay that a particular decisioll is legitimate is to say that the institution has the 11101,11 
right to decide that particular issue in the particular way that it has.'(' The distillc-
I ion between legitimate imti tutions and legitimate decisions matters becallse kgll i-
lltale imtitlltiolls can sometimes make illegitillwte decisiom. A decision Illight he 
lJ, "1+ 
" Allell Illlch"I1"" &- IZoiJcrl O. Keohelllc, Tlte l,e,;llll/ld<T of C/obal Covenwllee Institutio"",, 2,) I, 1'11/1\ 
&- INT'1. MT,\IRS .f0) • .fo) (2006). 
C/. ;\lleli Illlch"",,,,. Political LA.'gitilllo('l' dOl/ I lel/lOcTOC\', 1/2 ETIlICS 68,), (,S,)-,)o; IOIiN I( \\\1', 
POLITICAL I.IHERAI.IS~I .f2H (1<)1),). 
John 1\",\1,. l'()/iticall ,iberali.~1Il: RepiJ' 10 II,J/w"I/,". ')2 J. I'HII.. 132, qS 11l)l))), 
lv/orTOH'. h()p/>. ulld 0Pf)Clllil'llIll'1 
iIlcgl ti mate became it does 1I0t resul t frolll the proper procedure.' I f. for i Ilstallce, 
a legislative body require, half of its lllelllbers to be pre,ellt for a qUorlllI1, thell a 
decisioll is illegitilllate if it is made when ollly a third of tl\(: membership is presellt. 
Silllilariy, if a state's !t:gislatme enact, a law that violates a right protected by the 
state's eOllstitutioll, tlte law is illegitilllate; the only legitimate procccime for abridg-
ing that right is to changc the constitutioll. A decision could abo be ilicgitim;lte if it 
is grossly unjust." Although states call be legitilllate without beillg perfcctly just, llot 
cven a Icgitimate government of a legitimate statc has thc moral authority to violate 
the basic right:, of its citizells in systematic ways. I'or imLlllce, procedural propriety 
presumably would not confer legitilllac\ Oil a decision to strip a particuLlr ethnic 
Inillorit} of basic civil rights. 
III political (i.c., collective) decision 1II<lkillg, Iegitilliacy plays the role that COIl-
\(,111 phy.,> ill individual deci,ioll making. Allvolle who vollllltarily cedes allthority 
0\ ('1'>(1I11l' rdllge of isslies to a trade lInion, a bO,lrd of directors, a go"eflllllellt, or a 
olllldar deCl,jolHllaking body thereby acknowledges that legitill1acv is ,Ill appropri-
atc standard for evaluating collective decisions. As Allen I3llehanall PlltS it, eonscnt, 
despitc its prominence in social contract theorists' aecollnts of political Iegitilllacy, 
is "ill-suited to the political world" became "politics seenls to be cOllccfIled ... with 
how to get along when COllSent is lacking."'" 
As "participation" in an SRM experilllent is a collective choice, Ilot ,Ill illdividllal 
OIlC, researchers whose experiments have the kgitillwte apprm',d of all appropriatc 
illStitutioll will satisfy the delllands of thc Principle of Respcct. All appropriate imti-
tutiOIl, i II til is COil text, is olle wi th the global pol i tical legiti ll1acy to II lake decisions 
about SRJ\I experilllelits. 
For the pmposes of assessing possible IIlodels for a global SRM govefllallce illsti-
tutiOIl, we adopt Allan BlIekman ami Robert Keohane'" Complex Standard of legit-
illlacy for global govcfllance illStitutions ((;(;Is).'" In broad strokes, the Complex 
Standard has three par!>, e;leh of which we elaborate on below. First, a legitilllate 
illStitution must enjoy the ollgoillg consent of democratic states. Second, a Iegiti-
llIate institution Illust meet certaill "substantive" conditiolls: namcly, it nil 1st exhibit 
"minimal moral acceptability," maintain its illstitutiollal integrity, alld deliver posi-
tive benefits relative to altcfllative feasible illstitutiollal arrallgclIlellts. Third, a legit-
illlak institution must manifest certain "epistelllic" or "deliberati,e virtues," which 
provide sufficient trallsparenc\' ami accountability to ensure Illeanillgful participa-
tion by alld dill' cOllSideration of its stakeholders. 
Iii. at liS 
,\ Iii. at 17(>' 
'" Hllcl"lllall. -'lI/H<l lloie IS. ,Ii ()')l)·-70u. See <If,o IL\WI.S. Sll/Jra note 15, at ,l), alld .p~. 
Hllchallall II: KcohallC'. suprd 1I01e l.f. at ·jl7~2'). 
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The cOllsent of delllocratic states is ;[ IICCTSS;Jry, but not sufficient, conditioll for 
Ihe legitimacy of a CGI. Buchallall allt! "eohane worry primarily that thc "cllain 
of delegation" tying eCls to the illdividuals that legitimize the states that legitimize 
the GGls IHay become too long. With snch a long leash, the bmeallcrats in a eCI 
Illay Ilot be appropriately respollsive to stakeholders' Ileeds. In the case of SRM, at 
least, there is a further concefll. Several major states - certainly China and arguably 
Russia - are not democratic in the relevant sense. Indecd, a great deal of the world's 
population lives in nondemocratic states. GiveII thc potentially broad impact of the 
dccision to be made, we arc reluctant to claim that an institution regulating SRM 
could be lcgitimate without the cOllsent of at lcast the larger, less illegitimate lIon-
delllocratic states." 
The "substantive" cOllditions for legitimacy combine the need to deliver posi-
tive net benefits with the need to avoid gross illjustices, corruption, and abuses of 
power. Buchallan and Keohane explain that eeIs meet the first substantive condi-
tion, "llIinimal morally acceptability," if thcy do not "persist in cOl1llllitting seri-
ous injustices," wherc a ,eriolls injllStice consists in violating human rights."" They 
understand "institutional integrity" to meall adherence to a GGl's stated mission 
and rnethods. Corruption eroded the integrity of the UN Oil-For-Food Progralll, for 
cxample, because it permitted Saddam Hussein and other government officials to 
profit from thc sale of oil, even though the progralll aimed to ensure that Iraqi oil 
revenlles would benefit the Iraqi public without further enriching hilIJ.'l Even if a 
eCI meets these two substantive conditions, it I1lust deliver positive net benefits, 
as comparcd with other fcasible institlltional arrangements. (One feasible arrange-
mellt, of course, is the absence of a forlllal institution.) 
The most important part of the Complex Standard, in our view, is the requirement 
that GGls manifest the "epistelllic virtues" of transparency and accountability.'4 
These virtues set democratically legitimate GGls apart frolll global bureaucracies 
staffed by lInaccountable technocrats and operating opaquely. Even if the UN 
General Assembly unallimously voted to establish a Gel to be run by technocratic 
experts, and even if benevolent experts at the GGI met Buchanan and Keohane's 
substalltive conditions for legitimacy, the GCI would lack legitimacy if the global 
public had no effective way to monitor and sanction the eel's activities. A benev-
olent dictatorship is illegitimate, even if initially illStalled with public approval, 
because of the ease with whieh it can abuse its power; a benevolent but opaque and 
unaccountable technocracy is illegitimate for the same reason. 
" But c{ BlICh'lIIall & Keohane, Sllpra lIole 1+ al -112-14. 
" ld. "t-l19. 
0, ld. at -122- 2,. 
" ld. at-l2-1-" 
1')2 l'v[orrow, Kopp, and Oppellhellller 
Buchanan and Keohalle's epistelllic virtues serve to overcome the lllfon lIational 
asymrnetries that enable bllfeaucracies to subvert the will of their creators. '10 be 
transparent and accountable, a eGI mllst provide information on its goals and 
behavior in a format that is accessible and intelligible to transnational civil society. 
Furthermore, there Illllst be mechanisms by which civil society can challenge the 
Gel's goals, standards, and methods and sanction the GGI for failing to meets its 
standards or achieve its goals. Manifcsting these virtues involves actively engaging 
with transnational civil society, tlSually through national governments and interna-
tional NGOs. Engaging all groups that are significantly affected by an institution may 
require engaging actors olltside the llsllal circle of governments and NCOs. This is 
certainly the case with SRM, as those Illost vulnerable to decisions about SRM 
experiments may not be well represented by existing NCO, or goveflllllellts.'\ 
In light of Buchanan and Keohalle's discllssion, we believe that a Gel that met 
the Complex Standard would have the politicallegitirnacy to ll1ake decisions about 
cOllductillg SRM experiments. We do 1l0t claim that such an institution could make 
decisions about deploying SRlVl for nOll-research purposes. Such deployment wonld 
involve lIlore serious, longer-term conseqllences and commitments than an SRM 
experiment, and so decisions about deployment lllay require stricter conditions for 
legitimacy. These stricter conditions may comist [nerely ill more stringent appli-
cation of the Complex Standard, or they may involve the introduction of further 
criteria, sllch as a larger role for the UN General A~selllbly or other, Illore directly 
representative bodies. 
4. MODELS FOR AN INSTITUTION TO MANAGE SRM RESEARCH 
Dming the twentieth century, people developed or considered various institutions 
to govefll a wide range of international activities. We examine three of these insti-
tUtiOIlS as possible lllodels for an institution to manage SRM research. NOlle is a 
perfect allalogue because SRM experiments present a new kind of global problem: 
Ilever before has the world collectively decided whether to conduct experiments 
that could affect so lllany people's welfare in such significant ways. Individual states 
have made momentous decisions, major international organizations have imple-
mented policies with global consequences, and humanity has stumbled collectively 
into patterns of behavior - sllch as fossil fuel use - that reshape the globe. None of 
these decisions, however, cOllStituted an intentional choice by the global public to 
undertake a risky global experiment for the sake of acquiring new knowledge. Thus, 
OUT pmpose ill reviewing existing GGls is not to find a single, complete model 
'\ See Pablo Suarez. ja")Jl Blackstock & Maarten van Aalst, clC)wards a People-Centered Framework for 
Ceo(,Ilgineering Covcrnance: A/-julll<mitarian Perspective, 1 GEOENGINEERING Q. 2, j (2010). 
Political i.Rgitilllat')' ill I )l'l'/MOII S u/;out 1';xperimcllts 
lor llIJnJgillg SRM. InstcJd, wc.: tlt;l\\, \\·lI.lf lessOIlS we call frolll each case Jbollt 
tIle ways thJt al1 SRM governallce body could SJtisfy the Complex Standard for 
Ic.:giti1ll3CY· 
.p Institutiolls len Ma/lagil1g NlIclear Weapon;; 
SRM would ellJblc hUlllanity to altcr the world in a rebtively short pcriod of timc. 
Nuclear weapollS gave humanity power to alter the world overnight. Givcn the power 
of Iluclea r weapons, the international community has developed a suite of iIlStitu· 
tions to regulate them. These institutions aim to constrain nuclear testing, curb 
lIuclear proliferation, and reduce the size and dallger of existillg nuclear arsenals. 
In this section, we focus mainly Oil institutions that cOllstr;1in nuclear testing. We 
<.llso consider the hypothetical International Atomic Devclopment Agency (IADA), 
which the United States proposed in 1946 ;1S part of the Baruch Plan. 
4.1.1 Nuclear 'lest Ball Trcaties 
Between H)63 and 1996, the intematiollal community concluded four treaties 
that constrain the testing of nuclear weapons. Thcsc are the 1963 Treaty Banning 
Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water 
("Partial 'lest Ban Treaty" or IY!'BT); the 1970 Treaty on the Non·Proliferation 
of NucleJr Weapons (NPT); the 1973 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground 
Nucle<lr We<lpoll Tests ("Threshold ' lest Ban TreJty" or ' ITBT); and the 1996 
Comprehensive Nucle<lr·'lest·B<ln TreJty (CTBT). We refer to these treaties col-
lectively JS the "Test Ban Treaties" (TBTs) . The TBTs - e$pecially the NPT - form 
part of the Imger internatiollJI effort against proliferation Jlld toward disarmament. 
The history of that larger effort, and of the '} 'BTs in particular, holds important les· 
sons for those interested in forging international agreements about SRM. In other 
words, the role of transnational civil society,'(' the importance of vested interests 
at the domestic level,'7 the ways in which nuclear.weapoll states promised to pro-
tect llOn-nuclear·weapoll states from nuclear aggression,'s alld the various politicJI 
obstacles confronting diplomats in shaping the TBTs'~ would likely find echoes in 
the process of shaping SRM treaties. III this chapter, we leJve many of those lessons 
aside to focus narrowly Oil the question of the legitinwey of the TBTs' constrJillts on 
nuclear weapons tests. 
,I, See Rebect:a Johnson, Unfinished I3mille,s: The Negotiation of the C TBT alld the ~.:lId of Nuclear 
'testing 25 (2009)· 
>, See JOIINSON , supra lIote 26 , at 32, 41, 47. 
" See S.c. Res. 255, U.N. Doc. SIRESIz55 (jtlltl' H). Il/)X). 
>0 See JOIINSON. supra 1I0te 26, at 9-172. 
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Nuclear weapons tests share important features with SRM experiments. Like 
SRM experiments, nuclear weapons tests threaten the global public directly, through 
exposure to radioactive fallout, and indirectly, by contributing to the development of 
dangerous technologies. Furthermore, states conduct nuclear tests in part because 
they believe that the development or maintenance of nuclear weapons may be vital 
to their national interests in the future - a view that some states may one day adopt 
with respect to SRM technologies. 
The PTBT bans all nuclear explosions except those conducted underground)O 
(The treaty exempted subterranean tests partly because of technical difficulties in 
distinguishing such tests from earthquakes.) '[be treaty's purpose was to curtail the 
testing of nuclear weapons in order to slow the nuclear arms race and protect the 
public from radioactive fallout. Beginning in 1955, small multilateral conferences 
of major powers struggled for eight years to negotiate a ban on nuclear testing. 
Frustrated by the failure of these negotiations, the United States, the USSR, and the 
UK hammered out a treaty over the course of ten days in Moscow in 1963.3" This is 
not to say that the multilateral negotiations were fruitless. They laid the groundwork 
for the final negotiations, helping to ensure that the negotiations in Moscow gener-
ated a treaty to which most states consented. One hundred and eight parties signed 
the treaty that fall. The treaty has 124 parties, including all of the nuclear-armed 
states except China, France, and North Korea, none of which signed the treaty.P 
The PTBT did not involve the creation of a separate bureaucracy; the treaty implic-
itly relies on state parties to detect violations of the treaty. 
In the years following the PTBT, the NPT emerged from bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations, including discussion in the UN General Assembly. The treaty prohib-
its the transfer of nuclear weapons-related technologies from nuclear-weapon states 
to any other State, and it prohibits non-nuclear-weapon states from developing or 
acquiring nuclear explosives.H Rather than prohibiting certain kinds of nuclear tests, 
it prohibits tests by certain actors - namely, states that had not already detonated 
a nuclear explosive prior to January 1, 1967.'" The treaty opened for signature in 
1968 and entered into force in 1970. It currently has 190 parties, indicating broad 
global consent)5 The most prominent dissenters are India, Israel, and Pakistan. 
jO See Treaty Bannil,lg Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 
5, )~3, 4 UST 1313, ~ UNTS 4, at Art. I. 
JJ U.S. Department of State, Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Spac~ 
and Under Water (n.d.), http://www.state.govltlisn/4797.htrn. 
" Seeid. 
13 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July I, 1~8, ;u UST 483, 729 UNT S l~ at Art. 
I-II. 
l< ld. at Art. IX. 
l ! United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, "Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)" 
(n.d. ), http://www.un.orgldisannamentlWMDlNuclearINPT.shtrnl. 
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lelltral to the glohal Iiollproliferation regillle, the IAEA pbvs 0111" an iJl(lirect role 
hI' helpillg to enforce the rcgil1les prohibiting lluclear weapollS tests. 
Iu H)7+ the lJ uited States amI the USSR negotiated the 'I TBT. Thc treaty restricts 
IllIdcrgrolllld tests to vields of less thall ISO kilotoIlS.'- Conecflls abollt verifieatioll 
,tailed ratiflcltion for si\teell years until highly technical protocols werc devised 
IIHough bilater,d Illectillgs ill tIle late l<)kos. Followillg the adoption of these proto-
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condllctcd tests sillec HYi); India, Pakistall, and North Korca have t:;leh cOllducted 
two tests sillce thcll." The CTBT arguably played a callsal role in this redllction in 
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l,ike the PTBT, the CTBT emerged from a long series of disclIs,ions ill various 
[ontms. Amollg the most illlportant of these forums was the Group of Scientific 
I':xperts (CSI~:), which had collaborated since 1976 to develop the technical knowl-
edge needed to monitor and verify compliance with a test ban.+! Decades of dis-
cussion about a C'J'I3T culminated in two years of negotiations ill the Conference 
all Disarmament (CD) fWIll 1<)94 to 1996. Despite substantial progreS, iII those 
two years, Indian opposition still threatened to scuttle the treaty. Only Belgian and 
Australian parliamentary manellvering brought the draft treaty out of the CD and 
into the UN General Assembly. The Cel;eral Assembly elJdorsed the draft by an 
overwhelming majority." 
The CTBT calls for a dedicated international organization to monitor compli-
ance and implement the treaty; a Preparatory COlllmission has worked since 1997 
to lay the groundwork for implemelltation. The ccntral task of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-'lht-Ban Treaty Organization (C'I'BTO) is to monitor compliance with the 
treaty. This involves operating the International Monitoring System (lMS), which 
1lI0nitors for physical and chemical sigllS of a nuclear explosioll, and if necessary, 
conducting on-site inspections after suspected nuclear tests. The IMS consists of 
337 facilities around the world. These facilities monitor seisillic evellts, hydroa-
coustic activity, atmospheric infrasonic waves, and airborne radionuclides.-t(, 'fhe 
data they gather is channeled to the Intcrnational Data Centre (lDC) in Vienna 
and made available for civilian research. The IDC provides both raw data and 
quality-controlled data bulletins to member states, along with software alld training 
to help member states interpret the data.", This arrangement grew out of Ilegotia-
tors' illSistence that the IDC make its data transparent to member states that lack the 
resources to interpret raw data.-tH 
Collectively, the TBTs provide a framework by which the international commu-
Ility has forbidden various classes of dangerous experiments. What lessons do the 
TBTs hold for those looking to create a legitimate SRM GGl? 
First, the TBTs suggest a way to achieve some progress, ethically speaking, with 
respect to SRM experilllents, even if the international comlllunity cannot reach 
perfect agreement on whether or how to conduct stich experimellts. The TBTs do 
not constitute the global cOInlllunity's consellt to any particular test; they merely 
H See JOHNSON, supra note 26. at l.f'!. 
4i Id. at 46-1f2. 
4/' COlllprehemi\e Nuckar-'ti."t-Ban Treaty Organizatioll Preparatory COllllllissioll, The CTBT 
Verification Regime: Monitoring the Earth t'Jr Nuclear Explosions 2 (200<}), http://www.ctbto.org/ 
Ii ica(h IIi lilt ber _II p loacl/pll h 1 it _i nfOflllat ionhoo<)Neri lication_Regi I ne_1i Ila I._we b. pdf [J Icrei lrafter 
C'l'BTO Preparator\' COlllmissiolil. 
lC ld. at). 
4'\ JOHNSON supra note 26, at l.f'!. 
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l"prns, through a legitilll~ile C(:1. ;1 1('lm,d 10 "participate" ill certaill killds ,Ii 
('\jx:rilllcllts, The decisiol1 to perfilllil IlIllledl k,L or 1lot reillains in the 11;111(1,01 
llime states that ;Ire allthorizcd to do ,0 IllIdci the NPT, or have refused to joill Ihe 
NIYj', Irthe i1lternational COllllllllllity C;IIIIIOI ;Igrce 011 \\'hich SRM expcrinlelils 111l'\ 
would I ike to perform, they might at 1e;lst agree 011 what kinds of SRM c\pcrililclIh 
Ihev \\illnot toleratc, C01lducting all SRM experimcllt ill the gaps left by a partial 
lest b;lll would still be dceply ethically problclllatic, as it still amounts to hlllll;1I1 
n:pcrimclltation without consellt. However, e\en if it onl\' had the power to restrict 
IllC killds of expcrilllcnts that lllay be performed, a politicallv legitimate SRM eel 
would illcrease the global public's control over the clilltate ami might help detcr the 
Illost dangcrous expcrilllcllts, Although it would lIot satis!)· the Principlc of Respcct, 
II would bc diliedh' better thall nothillg. 
Sceond, the history of the 'I '13'j', delllollStrates tklt Illeaningful treatics tlla! enjoy 
\\idespread intcrnational Sllpport~ alld thus satist, olle of the criteria ill the Complex 
Standard for legitinlacy ~ can emerge frolll slIlall 1I1tlitiiaterai negotiations. The 
P'l'BT, fi)r instancc, was ultillwtcly negotiated by just threc states, alld yet it covers 
over olle hUlIdred ,LItes, The lessoll for SIUv! is that, if wider Ilegotiations falter, 
a rclati,ek slIIall workillg group IIlay be able to produce a treaty that the broader 
liitefllational COllllllllllity fillds ;rcceptablc. 
Admittedl\, IlOnc of thc T13T, have attailled lilliversal support. I<ach lacb the 
sllpport of at least olle Illajor powcr, illclndillg ;11 least one major delllocrac\,: Chilla 
;llId Fr;mce declilled to sign the IYI 'BT, ;dtllOugll both have signed the CTBT; Illdia, 
Israel, <IlId Pakist;11l rejcct thc NP'l'; China, India, Illdonesia, Irall, and tire United 
States, among others, hale yet to rati!}' the CTBT 
SCHilt' of tlrc differences betweell IIl1clcar wcapons and SRM, howcvcr, give rea-
'Oil to hope th;lt nlltitilateraillegotiations about SRM may be 1II0re productive than 
negotiatiolls over Illlclear test ballS. The 'l'BTs were Ilegotiated in a COil text in which 
sOllle states already had developed, tested, ali(I deployed nuclear weapoIlS; no Olle 
liaS yet tested or deployed SIUd techllologies. 'I '1Ius, a treaty that prohibits the further 
developlllent of SRi\l tecllllologics wOlddllot institutionalize existillg inequalities 
ill the way tlrat the N PT did. Furtherlllore, lIuclear weapolls pose Cl gre~lter teeh-
lIological challellgc than (SOIllC forms of) SRi\1. Thus, many states cOllld dcvelop 
SRM techllologies, \\'hereas fewer arc capable of prodllcillg lluclear weapons. If 
any state were to deplo\' such technologies, all states would face the consequcnce, 
of all altercd climate. This increases each state's illcentive to seek genuille illtclll;l-
tional eOllsellSUS relative to the llllclear IleapoIlS case, where each state had to worn 
lIlainly about Ilnfriendly states with high tecllllologieal capacity. These diffcrellcc, 
lila) facilitate agreemellts that enjoy- Clcell broader intcrnational support than IIIl' 
TBTs do. COllversely, the relative case of condllcting SIUvl experiments prOlidn 
Illall\ lllore opportunities for political manellvering. In principle, even small ,Liln 
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could tllreaten to conduct SRl'vl expcriments or withhold support frolll a treaty ill 
order to extract cOllcessions during the treaty llegotiatiolls. '10 the extent that larger 
states can link SRM to other issues on which they have leverage over smaller ,tates, 
however, such threats would not be particularly credible. 
Third, allY SRM Gel willnced the capacity to collect and analyze massive (jlIall-
tities of data. The episte1l1ic criteria of the Complex Standard requires that an SRM 
Gel illclude all international organization that can relay this data to interested 
parties in a comprehensible format. The IMS and IDC provide a usefullllodel for 
collecting and disseminating that data ill all epistemically virtuous way. The dual 
military-civilian use of the IMS also suggests that SRM monitoring could piggyback 
on existing facilities. 
One of the limitations of the analogy hctwem tlte 'I 'WI \ and SRM is particularly 
illstfllctive, too. Continued nuclear weapons tests provided 110 global benefit. 'I 'bus, 
tIle TBTs provide a net benefit to the global public, as required by the Complex 
Standard, although their benefit might not be as great as that of some alternative 
institution (e.g., a CTBT that is more likely to enter into force). SRM experiments 
might provide a global benefit, either by preparing the global public to deploy SRM 
effectively or by revealing that SRM is unwise. In the event that SIU.A experiments 
tmn out to be beneficial, an SRM eel modeled Oil the 'J'BTs would prove to be 
detrimeutal to the global public if it prohibited the necessary experiments. The 
eel would therefore fail to meet the COlIlplex Standard. One challenge of SRM. 
of course, is tltat if SRivl experiments do tum out to be necessary, we might not 
recognize that fact until it is too late. 'I 'h lIS , we may not know that the Gel has been 
detrimental- and to that extcnt illegitimate - until after the fact. 
4-1.2 Intefllational Atomic Dcvelopmellt Agency 
13dore the Cold War set in, the United States envisioned a very different regime for 
managing uuclear weapons <lnclnuciear technology generally. In Jnne 1946, Bernard 
Baruch urged the UN to create a powerful intemational body - the International 
Atomic Development Agency (IADA) - that would effectively control all aspects of 
nuclear tcchnology.4Y This so-called Baruch Plan largely followed an carlier report 
by the U.S. State Department, which had become known as the Acheson-Lilienthal 
Report. Under the Baruch Plan, the lADA would exercise close control over all phases 
of nuclear activity. Through ongoing surveys, it would identify all global deposits of 
4'1 BCfllard M. Baruch, Statement of the \ inited States Policy Oil Control of Atomic Energy as Presented 
by BCfllard 1\1 Barnell, Esq., to the linited Nations Atoillic Energy COlllmission (jllne 14, 1l)46), 
reprinted ill U.s. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. 2160, THE UNITED S·lATES AND Tin: UNITED NATIONS, REP. SERIES 
NO.2, TilE liNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY PROPOSALS (1946), available at http://www.ato111icarchive. 
c0111/Does/\)c!errcnceiBamchPlan.shtmll hert'inafter Bamch Plan j. 
Political Legitil7l<lc\ III I)" /.\llIm (Ihout Experiments 
Ilrunillill al)(I thoriullJ, controllillg Illl' l'\iJalll()11 of those minerals in an UllSPCClI Il'd 
IIlUllller. It would "exercise COlllpicll' 1J1.111:lgl'lial control" over plants prodlllilig 
fissile materials, and it would ()\Vll alld l'lIlJ1rol the output of those plants,i' 'Ihc 
I;\DA would mailltain a monopoly 011 research into nuclear explosives, althollgh 
lire manllfacture of nuclear \veapo!lS would be prohibited, aile! it would beeollle tile 
world's leading authority 011 peaceful uses of nllclear energy, Through lieensillg and 
illspectioll arrallgemellts, it would control ~llly lise of llllclear technology, providing 
lIIaterials for slich activities "uncler lease or other arrangernellt."I' This combination 
of expertise, ownership, mallagement, and inspection would enable the IADA to 
lillderstand, recognize, and detect misuses of nuclear technology while promoting 
its peaccfuillse ill an equitable, secure fashionY 
Baruch illSisted Oll swift sanctions agaimt violator,. Baruch specifically insisted 
that such ~allctiollS be immlllle to veto by the permanent members of the UN 
Security CounciL;; By a bare majoritv vote in the Seclllity Council, the UN would 
have been able to sanctioll slates that the IADA ruled to be in violation of the inter-
Itationalnuclear reginle. 
In part because of Bamch'o insistence OIl veto-proof sanctions, his proposal ended 
ill a diplolll<ltie stalelllate. The Soviet linion rejected the IADA out of concern that 
the United States would retain its nuclear arsenal alld that the IADA would become 
:In instrument of li.S. polic\', In H)49 , the Sovict Union detonated its first ll11cblr 
weapon. The arIllS race had begun, and the prospect of centralized global gover-
nance of nuclear weapons faded. 
Given both its discretion ill the devcloplllent of nuclear fuel and certaill kinds of 
Iluelear research, as well as its power in sanctioning sovereign states, the IADA would 
have exercised considerable authority ill lllaking collective decisiollS about Iluelear 
techllology. Assuming that no state managed to evade the IADA long enough to 
develop Iluclear weapollS OIl its own, the IADA would have exercised a complete 
mOllop0ly over a world-changing technology. 
Thus, the IADA, as proposed by Baruch, comtitutes a conceivable model for an 
SRM govemancl' institution. It would have been an internatiollal organization for 
research into a sensitive, dangerous suite oftecllllologics, about which it would have 
made importallt decisions on behalf of the intemational COlllIllllllity - includillg 
decioions about experimental uscs of thc technology. If it ltael the will to do so, sllch 
an organization would be better positioned than any viable alternative to ensure that 
researchers behave cthieally - both with respect to till' political legitimacy of their 
Id. ,II H. 
i' Id. 'Ill). 
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decisions and with respect to satisfying other requirements of ethical conduct, such 
as those in our proposed ethical framework." 
The degree to which such a program would actually ensure ethical conductofSRM 
experiments, however, would depend heavily on the structure of its decision-making 
processes and 011 the degree to which its personnel meet the substantive conditions 
and exhibit the epistemic virtues required by the Complex Standard. One concern 
about such an organization is that the technocrats who run it may develop goals or 
preferences that diverge from the interests of the international community. Some 
staff members' enthusiasm for SRM might exceed that of the global public in dan-
gerous ways. Some might be susceptible to pressure from particular states whose 
views differ from those of the international community, or might obscure infornla-
tion to protect or further their own careers at the expense of public transparency and 
accountability. Any of these factors could cause the organization to violate the sec-
ond or third criteria of the Complex Standard. Thus, placing so much responsibility 
for SRM research in the hands of unelected technocrats might lead to politically 
illegitimate institutions or decisions. 
The unhappy fate of the Baruch Plan, however, provides an instructive lesson for 
thinking about the conditions required for widespread international acceptance of 
an SRM GGI, as required by the Complex Standard. The Baruch Plan was infeasi" 
ble because it concentrated too much power in an international organization. Some 
states may have bristled at ceding such power to an international body. Others, such 
as the Soviet Union, may have feared that the IADA would have been too beholden 
to the United States. Assuming that contemporary states would likewise reject any 
GGI that is either too powerful or too likely to be dominated by one or more great 
powers, the international community would need to design an SRM governance 
institution carefully in order to give it an appropriate amount of power and inter-
national accountability. Otherwise, the SRM GGI would be unlikely to secure the 
multilateral consent required for legitimacy. Still, if the international community 
decides to delegate limited authority for SRM experiments to an INGO, the IADA 
offers one possible conception for doing so. 
+2 Institutions for Managing Global Commons 
A stable planetary climate represents a type of global commons - a global public 
good that no single country is capable of controlling.55 SRM experiments involve a 
rapid, deliberate change in the climate - a change that could have negative conse-
54 See Morrow et aI., supra note 3, at 3-Q. 
55 Marvin S. Soros, Garret Hardin and Tragedies of Global Commons, in HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 35,45 (Peter Dauvergne ed., 2.OCl6). 
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lluences for some persons and ecosyslclll.\. Thus, GGls designecl to manage global 
commons provide another type of lIlodei for all SRM GGL 
Like a stable climate, Antarctica is viewed by many as a global commons. The 
Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), established ill 1959 by the hvelve countries active in 
Antarctica during the International Geophysical Year, sought to ensure the peaceful 
use of this commons for scientific exploration.56 Today, the Treaty has forty-eight 
parties. Twenty-eight of these parties are active in Antarctica and therefore have 
decision-making authority as Consultative Members; the remaining twenty have 
observer status as Non-Consultative MembersY 
The original Antarctic Treaty focused primarily on freezing territorial claims and 
establishing a legal framework for exploration. Environmental issues entered the 
ATS through later protocols, the most comprehensive of which is the 1991 Protocol 
on Environmental Protection (the Madrid Protocol). The Madrid Protocol, which 
entered into force ill 1998, is perhaps most broadly known for establishing a fifty-year 
moratoriul1l on exploiting mineral resources in the Antarctic; more relevant to our 
analysis, it also established a set of principles regarding environmental protection, 
an intergovemmental body of scientific experts to offer advice on environmental 
issues, a procedure for environmental impact assessment of activities in Antarctica, 
and a consultative process regarding these activities. 1b 
Article 3 of the Protocol lays out a set of principles that gives primacy both to 
ethical concerns and scientific research. These principles require that activities 
in the Antarctic be planned and executed "so as to limit adverse impacts on the 
Antarctic."\9 The article also mandates monitoring of risky activities and requires 
that such activities be modified or stopped if monitoring reveals adverse impacts.60 
In principle, this article requires states parties to give significant weigh t to environ-
mental, ethical, and even aesthetic values in regulating governmental and nongov-
ernmental activities ill the Antarctic. Among the ethical principles recognized are 
those akin to our Principles of Minimization and Respect. 61 
Article 11 establishes the Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP). The 
CEP consists of representatives from each Party to the Protocol, along with their advi-
sors. Parties to the ATS who are not Parties to the Protocol, as well as relevant NGOs 
invited by the CEP, may attend meetings as observers. The Protocol instructs the 
CEP to provide technical advice Oil the implementation of the Protocol, including 
\6 Antarctic Treaty, 1 Dec., 1959,402 UNTS 71. 
\7 Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty System, "Parties" (2008), Ilttp://www.ats.aq/devAS/ats_partics.aspx. 
I' Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, 4 Oct., 1991, 30 ILM I.f55 
[hereinafter Madrid Protocol]. 
\'1 Id. at Art. 3, para. 2. (See the Appendix to this chapter for the complete text of Article 3.) 
00 Id. at Art. 3, para. 2(d)-(e), 4(h). 
(n See Morrow et aI., supra note 3, at 3--6. 
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advice on the effectiveness of parties' efforts to comply with the Protocol hl Becallse 
the CEP Illllst release reports on its sessions to states parties and to the public'!'l it 
eould alert interested states and members of civil society to activities that run con-
trary to the Protocol. Ultimately, however, the CEP's role is strictly advisory; it has 
no power to affect decisions directly. 
The states parties hold ultimate responsibility for assessing the environmental 
impact of their activities, although they must discuss their assessment of sOllie activi-
ties with the other Parties and the CEP. As laid out in Article 8 alld Annex I, the 
Protocol recognizes three tiers of activities in the Antarctic: those determined by 
national procedures to have "less than a rninor or transitory impact," those "likely 
to have no more than a minor or transitory impact," and those likely to have "more 
thall a minor or transitory impact."('4 Activities falling into the second category 
require an Initial Environmental Evaluation characterizing the activity, alternatives 
to the activity, and likely impacts 6 \ Activities falling into the third category require a 
Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation (CEE), which describes the state of the 
environment prior to the activity; the activity alld all relevant alternatives, including 
the alternative of not proceeding with the activity, alollg with the expected conse-
quences of each altemative; the direct and indirect impacts of the proposed activity; 
the cllmulative impact ofthc proposed activity, givell existing and cllfrently planned 
activities; the methodology and data llsed to forecast consequences; the measures 
that could be taken to monitor thc effects of the activity and to minimize or mitigate 
them; a nontechnical SU1l1mary of the above information; and the contact informa-
tion for the al1thor(~) of the CEE 6 (, 
The draft CEE must be circulated for review to the public, to the Antarctic Treaty 
parties, and to the CEP. In principle (although not always in practice), the activ-
ity cannot proceed until the draft CEE has been considered by the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting on the advice of the Committee, and a final version of the 
CI<:E lI1l1st respond to the comments raised ill the review process. The draft and 
final eEl<: must be made publicly available 67 Ollce the activity begins, its impacts 
lllust be monitored. 6K 
Christopher Joyner highlights a 111lll1ber of potential weakllesses in the Madrid 
Protocol process.!>') The role of the Envirollmental Impact Assessmellt consultative 
r" Madrid Protocol. supra note 58, at Art. II. 
r" Id. at Art. 11, para. 5. 
"4 Td. at Art. H, para. I. 
"; Madrid Protocol, wpra nole 58, at Anllex I, Art. 2. 
ei, It!. at Annex t. Art. " para. (1)~(2). 
,,- Id. at ,\nnc}' I, Art. j, pam. (3H6). 
r" Id. at Art. 8. 
r" CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, COVERNINC TilE FROZEN COMMONS: TilE ANTARCTIC RE(;I~II, AND 
ENVIRON~fENTAL PROTECTION 165~7-l (lC)98). 
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process is fllndall1entally hortatory; alth()Ilgh individual govemIllents must respond 
to comments LInder the Protocol, the) rdaill the final decision on whether to proceed 
with a specific activity. In addition, the bOlllldaries between the different categories 
of activities are ill-defined, left to sOllie combination of party judgment and the evo-
lution of precedellt. More broadly, the mechanism of enforcement of the Protocol 
in general is unclear: parties are to enforce it through laws and regulations, and 
shall exert "appropriate efforts, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations" 
to ensure that other parties do,7° whereas an Arbitral Tribunal or the International 
Court of Justice is empowered to settle disputes, but again these are largely hortatory 
procedures.'1 
Despite these problems, the Madrid Protocol provides a GGI model that directly 
addresses clements of scientific research ethics and the Complex Standard. In par-
ticular, the consultative process for assessing proposed activities exemplifies the 
transparency and stakeholder engagement necessary for legitimacy. CEEs must con-
tain nOli technical sUll1Illaries, making thcm more easily digestible by states and civil 
society. Draft and final CEEs, along with reports on Cb:P sessions, are distributed to 
states parties and the public)' This increases the transparency of the international 
governance of Antarctic activity, as requircd by the Complex Standard. 
The Madrid Protocol does not, however, provide an effective means for citizens 
of one state to hold allother state or its citizens accountable for behavior that vio-
lates the Protocol. The hortatory nature of the EIA process would be even more 
problematic in the case of SRM, where the incentive to ignore the exhortations 
of other states might be much greater than in the Antarctic case. If an SRM Gel 
had no more power than the CEP docs in Antarctica, then it could not deter even 
a modcrately motivated state from conductillg SRM experiments. Conversely, an 
SRM eGI that could, at its own discretion, prohibit certain experiments would be 
too powerful - too much like Baruch's proposed IADA - to be feasible, and a Gel 
that could prohibit experiments if and only if they violated constraints laid down in 
a trcaty would bc more like the CTBT than the CEP. Thus, replacing the hortatory 
Illodel of the Madrid Protocol with something stronger brings us back to the nuclear 
weapons testing models. 
Some elell1ents of the Madrid Protocol could bc readily adapted to the context of 
SRM research governance. Article 3 in particular would need just one major addi-
tion - impact on hUlIlan populations - and a suite of minor contextual adaptations 
to address the global climate commons instead of the Antarctic "frozen commons." 
The conditions and processes for conducting environmental impact assessmeIlts 
Cu Madrid Protocol, supra note 58, at Art. q, para. 1-2. 
" JOYNER, supra note 69, at 166. 
Madrid Protocol, supra note 58, at Anllex I, Art. , 
tLlllsiate febtively easily to the SRl\l c;lse a.\ well. By requirillg earlier IIl\'oh'ellJellt 
fmlll other states and all SRM counterpart of the CEP, along with ~cielltific peer 
revicw of SRM research proposals, all SRrvl eel might be able to exert llIore illl1tl-
ellee on the shaping of proposals thall the CEP exerts 011 proposed activities in 
the Alitarctic. III ,111\ case, the Madrid Protocol provides a model for achieving the 
trallSpareJlc\ reqllired for legitimacy 
One challenging difference between the Antarctic cOlltext and the SIUvl context 
relates to the rallge of parties involved: the Antarctic 'I 'reaty ellgages in a consulta-
tive status with only the twenty-eight countries active in Antarctica, whereas a eel 
focused 011 SRM research would need to engage lIot just the COUll tries actively con-
dllctillg research but the larger grollp of coulltries with populatiom potentially at 
II:-.k. SIUd experiments wOlild also be likely to affed variolls states inlllore direct and 
111m" :-.ignificant ways than Antarctic activities would, making disputes over SRM 
IllOiC heated thall those over Antarctic activities. Broadcr and lIlore contentious dis-
(,lIssioll:-. over SRM experiments may increase the time it takes to complete an EtA 
for allY proposed experiment, as compared to the time it takes to complete an EtA 
for proposed Alltarctic activities. The broader e()llStitllenc~ of all SRl'vl GCllllight 
also make it more difficliit to craft an institution that enjoy, sufficiently widespread 
acceptance to be legi tilildte. 
As the preceding di,cussion shows, incorporating elClllents of the Madrid Protocol 
into an SRIVI eCI could help improve the chances that the eCI would retain its 
legitimacy under tlte COlnplex Standard, especiall\, in terms of epistelllic virtues and 
the delivery of positive Ilet benefits to the global public. By providing a smailer but 
open fOflllt1 for illtcrtlational deliberation abollt the decisions of individual statcs, it 
could also improve the cel's ability to reach legitimate decisions about particular 
SRM experiments, withollt requiring unallillJ(H1S consent frolll the international 
conll1lllllity abollt that experiment. As ils processes arc hortatory rather than coer-
cive, however, an SRM eel modeled 011 tlte Protocol would have little power to 
rein in states that decided to pursue SRM without intef1latiollal approval. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The intefllational cOllllllllnity is startillg to consider SRM as a stopgap or emergency 
measure for coping with the possible inadeqllacy of medillll1-term lIIitigation efforts. 
As it wOllld bc foolish and unethical to deploy SRM without an adequate under-
standing of the technology, state or nOli-state actors lIIay decide to pursue SRM 
research - potentially illcluding large-~cale experiments - ill the IIcar future. 
Large-scale SRM experiments, such as those involving the illjection of enough 
reflective aerosols into the stratmpherc to produce detectable climatic changes at 
the regional or global scale, iJIVolve sigllificant ethical challenges. Olle importallt 
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challellge is the need for politically Icgillillatc decisions about whether alld how to 
conduct sllch experiments; this requirelllent par;:dlels the requirement for infolillcd 
consent ill medical cxperiments. Given that all SRM experiment is a glob<ll ()[Ie. the 
decision to ulldertake it IIlllst be made by a politically legitinl<1te GGI. 
The Complex Stalldard for the political legitimacy of GGls involves three bro,ld 
reqllirements. First. the eGI I1lllst enjoy the consent of most (democratic) states. 
Second, the eel Illllst meet certaill substaIltive conditions, mch as the avoidance 
of seriolts injustices, the delivery of positive net benefits, and the maintenance of 
illStitutional illtegrity. Third, the Gel I1IUSt exhibit certaill epistemic virtues, such 
as transparellcy and accountability. 
Other GGls hold lessolls for the design of a legitimate SRM GCL Our analysis of 
the international nuclear testing regillle suggests that a legitimate SRM Gel might 
evolve through negotiations among a slllaller, more manageable group of powers, 
as long as the Gel itself receives the approval of the UN. It also suggests that, in the 
absence of a GGI empowered to authorize particular experiments, an institution 
with the legitimate authority to prohibit certain classes of experiments collid protect 
the world agaillSt the most ethically problematic ones. As our analysis of the Madrid 
Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty suggests, an imtitution requiring and facilitating 
illternational discllssion of allY proposed SRM experiment would fare well on the 
third, epistcmic criterion of the Complex Stalldard. Spelling out a set of principles 
that SRM experiments lllust follow, as the Madrid Protocol does for AIlLuctic activi-
ties, might iIlcrease the likelihood that sllch an institlltion could deliver positive net 
benefits, as required by the second substantive criterioll of the Complex Standard. 
Our analysis of the proposed IADA suggests that a llIore powerful GCI. which might 
have the power to authorize specific experiments, lIlay find it more difficllit to meet 
the Complex Standard; such a powerful Gel may never enjoy the widespread sup-
port required for legitimacy, it is more likely to depart from the wishes of its creators, 
and it may do so in ways that violate the substantive and epistemic criteria of the 
COlll plex Standard. 
The lessoIls from these case studies are complementary. A single institution 
could prohibit certain classes of experiments, such as the TBTs, while facilitating 
intemational dialogue about the experiments proposed by states or non-state actors, 
like the Madrid Protocol. Such an institution would leave room for states to create 
a llluitilateral organization that combined research efforts without exercising the 
far-reaching powers and technological mOllopolies of the IADA. This is only a pre-
liminary vision, of COllfse, of an approach to managing SRM research, leaving llIany 
institutional issues open for further exploratioll. 
The international comJllunity has Ilever confronted a decision quite like that of 
conducting SRM experiments - much less to deploy SRM. That is why none of 
the institutions we consider provide perfect analogues for an SRM GGI. This is 
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not til<: tlrst time, however, that humanity has faced novel problems demandiIlg 
unprecedented institutions. We believe that by leaming from the Sllccesses and fail-
mes of the past, the international community can design an illStitution to manage 
decisions about SRM and SRM research in an ethically responsible way. 
APPENDIX: ARTICLE 3 OF THE MADRID PROTOCOL 
The complete text of Article 3 of the Madrid Protocol reads: 
The protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated 
ecosystems and the intrinsic valuc of Antarctica, including its wilderness and 
aesthetic values and its value as an area for the conduct of scientific research, 
in particular research essential to understanding the global environment, shall 
be fundamental considerations in the planning and conduct of all activities ill 
thc Antarctic Treaty area. 
2 To this end: 
(a) activities in the Antarctic Treaty area shall bc planncd and conducted so 
as to limit adverse impacts Oil the Antarctic environment and dependent 
and associated ecosystems; 
(b) activities in thc Antarctic Treaty area shall be planned and conducted so 
as to avoid: 
(i) adverse effects on climate or weather pattcrns; 
(ii) signitlcant adverse effects on air or water quality; 
(iii) signitlcant changes in the atmospheric, terrestrial (including aquatic), 
glacial or marine environments; 
(iv) detrimental changes ill the distribution, abundance or productivity of 
species of populations of species of fauna and flora; 
(v) further jeopardy to endangered or threatened species or populations 
of such species; or 
(vi) degradation of, or substantial risk to, areas of biological, scientitlc, 
historic, aesthetic or wilderness signitlcancc; 
(c) activities in the Antarctic Treaty area shall be planned and conducted 
on the basis of information sufficient to allow prior assessments of, and 
informed judgements about, their possible impacts on the Antarctic envi-
ronment alld dependent and associated ecosystems and on the value of 
Antarctica for the conduct of scientific research; such judgments shall 
take account of: 
(i) the scope of the activity, including its area, duration and intensity; 
(ii) the cumulative impacts of the activity, both by itself and in combina-
tion with other activities in the Antarctic Treaty area; 
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(iii) whether the actilill II '" .1<111111('111;"11 affect allY other activity in the 
Antarctic Treaty ;1\(';1: 
(iv) whether technology ;lIld p")(cdllrCS :lrc available to provide for cnvi-
ronmentally safe operal i( 1I1~< 
(v) whether there exists the ca pacill' to Illonitor key environmental para11l-
eters and ecosystem COIIII)(IIlCllis so as to identif)' and provide early 
warning of any adverse effects of the activity and to provide for such 
modification of operating proccdmes as may be necessary in the light 
of the resul ts of monitoring or increased knowledge of the Antarctic 
ellvironment and dependent and associated ecosystems; and 
(vi) whether there exists the capacity to respond promptly and effectively 
to accidcnts, particularly those with potential cnvironmelltal effects; 
(d) regular anc! effective monitoring shall take place to all assessment of 
the impacts of ongoing activities, including the verification of predicted 
iIllpacts; 
(c) regular and effective monitoring shall take place to facilitate early detec-
tion of thc possible unforeseen effects of activities carried on both within 
and outside the Antarctic Treaty area 011 the Antarctic environment and 
dependent and associated ecosystems, 
3 Activities shall be planned and conducted in the Antarctic Treaty arca so as 
to accord priority to sciClltific research and to preserve the vallie of Antarctica 
as an area for the conduct of Stich research, including research essential to 
understanding the global ellvironmcnt. 
4 Activities undertaken in the Antarctic Treaty area pursuant to scientific 
research program~, tourism and all other govefllll1ental and nongovernmental 
activities in the Antarctic Treaty area for which advance llotice is required in 
accordance with Article VII (5) of the Antarctic Treaty, including associated 
logistic activities, shall: 
(a) take place in a mallller consistellt with the principles in this Article; and 
(b) be lI1odified, suspended or cancelled if they result in or threaten to result 
in impacts upon the Antarctic environillent or dependent or associated 
ecosystems inconsistent with those principles,~l 
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